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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

Case No.

950778-CA

Classification Priority 2

vs.
MARK DEAN ANDERSON,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a sentence following convictions for
Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, a Class A Misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code Ann. §41-6-44 (1994); Driving on Suspended
or Revoked Operator's License, a Class B Misdemeanor, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. §53-3-227 (1994); and False Information to a Law
Enforcement Officer, a Class B Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. §76-8-507 (1983), in the Fifth Judicial District Court in
and for Iron County, State of Utah, the Honorable Robert T.
Braithwaite, presiding.

This Court has jurisdiction to hear this

appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2) (f) (1995).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The issues presented in this appeal are:
1.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in sentencing

Defendant to consecutive terms of imprisonment and staying an

additional six-month term of imprisonment?

"Before the reviewing

court may overturn the sentence given by the trial court, it must
be clear that the actions of the judge were so inherently unfair as
to constitute an abuse of discretion."

State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d

1048, 1051 (Utah App. 1991) (Citing State v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885,
887 (Utah 1978) (Emphasis added).
2.

If the Court adopts a stricter standard, based upon the

fact that appellant failed to provide the appellate court with the
presentence

report,

applicable?

is

In order

the
to

"presumption
avoid

errors,

of

regularity"

sentencing

still

procedures

require a somewhat stricter standard than the general presumption
of regularity.

State v. Lipsky, 608 P.2d 1241, 1248 (Utah 1980) .

Even if this Court were to take the more rigorous stance, refusing
to presume the regularity of the proceedings below in absence of
the presentence report, the proceedings at the sentencing hearing
amply show that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
Moreover, the presentence report, as provided by appellee, supports
the proposition that the trial court did not abuse its discretion.
For questions of fact involved in sentencing decisions, frequently
constituting threshold inquiries that must be satisfied prior to
addressing the legal intricacies, a "clearly erroneous" standard
applies.

State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048, 1049-50 (Utah App. 1991).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES

Determinative constitutional provisions, statutes and rules
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are compiled in Appendix A where not set forth in the body of this
brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the sentence, set forth in a Judgment,
Sentence, Stay of Execution of Sentence, Order of Probation, and
Commitment by the Honorable Robert T. Braithwaite, Fifth Judicial
District Court, following a trial.
On or about April 24, 1995, the Defendant was convicted of
Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, a Class A Misdemeanor, in
violation of Utah Code Ann, §41-6-44 (1994); Driving on Suspended
or Revoked Operator's License, a Class B Misdemeanor, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. §53-3-227 (1994); and False Information to a Law
Enforcement Officer, a Class B Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. §76-8-507 (1983).

Following a presentence investigation

report, as prepared by the Utah Department of Adult Probation and
Parole, sentencing occurred on October 10, 1995, and the Defendant
was sentenced to one (1) year in the Iron County Jail pursuant to
his conviction for Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol, a Class
A Misdemeanor; six (6) months in the Iron County Jail pursuant to
his conviction for Driving on a Suspended or Revoked Operator's
License, a Class B Misdemeanor, said term to run consecutively to
the one (1) year term set forth above; and six (6) months in the
Iron County Jail pursuant to his conviction of False Information to
a Law Enforcement Officer, a Class B Misdemeanor, said term of
imprisonment

to

run

concurrently

with

the

other

sentences.

Moreover, the Court sentenced the Defendant to pay a fine in the
sum and amount $900, and ordered the Defendant to pay restitution
in the amount of $5,000 as a term and condition of any probation
the Defendant may receive.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On October 8, 1994, on Interstate 15 near Cedar City, Utah,
Adam Russell was driving a vehicle (pulling a trailer) and was
traveling toward his home when his vehicle was struck violently
from behind by another vehicle. Mr. Russell's vehicle careened off
the highway and rolled, causing serious injuries to Mr. Russell and
severely damaging Mr. Russell's vehicle and trailer.

Mr. Russell

suffered neck injuries that required treatment with a "halo" and
pins in his head for several weeks.

Utah Highway Patrol Trooper

Doug Twitchell responded to the accident scene and located another
male individual "hiding in the bushes" and obviously intoxicated.
The individual, later identified as Defendant Mark Dean Anderson,
initially gave Trooper Twitchell the name of his brother (who is
deceased), and it took several hours for Trooper Twitchell to learn
that the Defendant had provided a false name.

The State asserted

at sentencing that the Defendant submitted the false name as
Defendant has an extensive criminal record, numerous wants and
warrants throughout the state of Utah, and the Defendant has not
held a valid Utah driver's license since 1985.
The Defendant was tried twice in absentia, after several
efforts to locate the Defendant for trial and sentencing failed,
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but each time the Defendant objected and the matter was set for a
new trial date.
convicted

On April 24, 1995, the Defendant was again

(in his absence) of Driving Under the Influence of

Alcohol, a Class A Misdemeanor; Driving on Suspended or Revoked
Operator's License, a Class B Misdemeanor; and False Information to
a Law Enforcement Officer, a Class B Misdemeanor.

The Defendant

fled to the state of Oregon, was located, and refused to waive
extradition.

The

Iron County Attorney's

Office

forwarded a

governor's warrant to Oregon and, after several hearings in Oregon
regarding extradition and days before the governor's warrant was to
arrive, the Defendant waived extradition and was returned to Utah.
On September 6, 1995, the Defendant appeared before the Court
for sentencing.

The Court ordered a presentence investigation

report prior to sentencing, to be prepared by the Utah Department
of

Adult

Probation

and

Parole, and

upon

completion

of

the

presentence report the matter was called on for sentencing on
October 10, 1995, at 9:00 a.m., in Cedar City, Utah.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Defendant has not provided this Court with a copy of the
presentence report, and so it should presume regularity in the
proceedings below and decline to consider Defendant's claims.
However, even without the report, the transcript of the sentencing
hearing shows that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
sentencing the Defendant to consecutive terms of imprisonment in
the Iron County Jail, staying an additional six-month sentence, and
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ordering the Defendant to pay a fine in the sum and amount of $900
and restitution

in sum and amount of $5,000.

The presentence

report, as set forth and included in appellee's brief, clearly
supports the Court's sentence in this case and as relating to this
Defendant.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
REGULARITY IN THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW SHOULD BE
PRESUMED WHERE DEFENDANT FAILED TO INCLUDE IN
THE RECORD ON APPEAL THE PRESENTENCE REPORT.
HOWEVER, RELYING ONLY ON THE RECORD OF THE
SENTENCING HEARING, THE RECORD INDICATES THE
TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
SENTENCING DEFENDANT.
"Before the reviewing court may overturn the sentence given by
the trial court, it must be clear that the actions of the judge
were so inherently unfair as to constitute an abuse of discretion."
State v. Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048, 1051 (Utah App. 1991) (Citing State
v. Gerrard, 584 P.2d 885, 887 (Utah 1978).
"The burden of showing error is on the party who seeks to
upset the judgment."

State v. Noren, 704 P.2d 568, 571 (Utah 1985)

(Quoting State v. Jones, 657 P.2d 1263, 1267 (Utah 1982)).
In this case, Defendant has failed to include in the record on
appeal

the

presentence

report

containing

relevant

information

regarding the Defendant's background and criminal history which
undoubtedly
decision.
merits

of

formed

the basis

of

the

trial

court's

sentencing

On such failure, this Court may decline to review the
Defendant's

claim,
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presuming

regularity

in

the

proceedings below.

See State v. Eloge, 762 P.2d 1, 2 (Utah 1988)

per curiam (presuming regularity in the proceedings below where the
Defendant, challenging the trial court's discretion in denying him
a 90-day diagnostic evaluation and sentencing him to a potential
life sentence, failed to provide the court with a copy of the
presentence report from which it might have assessed the trial
court's discretion);

State v. Mitchell, 671 P.2d 213, 215 (1983)

(presuming regularity in the proceedings below where, though no
transcript of the sentencing hearing was provided the appellate
court, there was no suggestion that a presentence report was
effectively concealed from the defendant.)
The Defendant's only argument is that the trial court abused
its discretion in sentencing the Defendant because the sentencing
judge stated, "I think you've been deceptive with the Court,
dishonest with the Court.
criminal problem.

You have a serious drinking problem,

This, to me, is a clear cut case that requires

the maximum sentence." (Tr. 9) The Defendant fails to set forth any
case law or statutory support for the proposition that these
statements by the trial court constitute an abuse of discretion.
The Defendant's argument is frivolous.
The Defendant then argues that Article I, Section 9 of the
Constitution of the State of Utah, and the Eighth Amendment of the
United States Constitution have been violated as the Court's
sentence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.

Again, the

Defendant fails to cite case law or statutory authority for the

proposition

that

a sentencing

judge

cannot

impose

consecutive

sentences.

Moreover, it should be noted that if the trial court

had deemed it appropriate, the Defendant could have been sentenced
to an additional six (6) months, consecutive to the two (2) other
counts, causing for a total term of incarceration of twenty-four
(24) months, as opposed

to the eighteen

imposed by the trial court.

(18) months

actually

Again, the Defendant's argument is

frivolous.
Finally, the sentence imposed by the trial court was within
the parameters

provided

by

law with

respect

to

the

terms

of

imprisonment (Utah Code Ann. §76-3-204 (1973)), the fine (Utah Code
Ann. §76-3-301 (1995)), and the restitution (Utah Code Ann. §76-3201 (1995) ) .
POINT II
EVEN IF THIS COURT WERE TO TAKE THE MORE
RIGOROUS STANCE, REFUSING TO PRESUME THE
REGULARITY OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW IN ABSENCE
OF THE PRESENTENCE REPORT, THE PROCEEDINGS AT
THE SENTENCING HEARING AMPLY SHOW THE TRIAL
COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION.
State v. Lipsky, 608 P.2d 1241, 1246 (Utah 1980) (citing State
v.

Carson,

597

P.2d

862,

866

(Utah

1979),

stands

for

the

proposition that, in order to avoid errors, sentencing procedures
require a somewhat stricter standard than the general presumption
of regularity.

Even if this Court were to take the more rigorous

stance, refusing to presume the regularity of the proceedings below
in

absence

of

the presentence

report, the proceedings

at

the

sentencing hearing amply show the trial court did not abuse its
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discretion.

The transcript

from the sentencing proceedings,

setting forth the statements by the sentencing judge ("I think
you've been deceptive with the Court, dishonest with the Court.
You have a serious drinking problem, criminal problem.

This, to

me, is a clear cut case that requires the maximum sentence.") is
not an abuse of discretion.
Finally, the State has included the presentence investigation
report (see Appendix A) , and the State of Utah asserts that the
presentence report provided the sentencing judge with a sufficient
basis upon which to sentence the Defendant to eighteen (18) months
in the Iron County Jail, with a six- (6-) month sentence stayed,
together with a $900 fine and restitution in the amount of $5,000.
CONCLUSION
Based
respectfully

upon

the

foregoing

reasons,

the

State

of

Utah

requests that this Court affirm the Defendant's

sentence.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

22

day of February, 1996.

S ( W T ^ B15RNS
Iron County Attorney
Attorney for Appellee
MAILING CERTIFICATE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed two (2) full, true and correct
copies of the within and foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLEE to Mr. Keith
C. Barnes, Esquire, Attorney for Appellant, P.O. Box 765, Cedar

City, Utah 84721-0765, by first-class mail, postage fully prepaid,
on this

2-Z-

day of February, 1996.

scmr H. BURNS
Iron County Attorney
Attorney for Appellee
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APPENDIX A

MOTOR VEHICLES

41-6-41

41-6-41. Statistical information regarding accidents —
Annual publication.
The department shall tabulate and may analyze all accident
reports and shall publish annually, or at more frequent
intervals, related statistical information as to the number and
circumstances of traffic accidents.
1987
41-6-42. Local p o w e r s to require report.
A local authority may by ordinance require that the operator
of a vehicle involved in any accident, or the owner of the
vehicle, also file with the designated municipal department a
\*rritten report of t h e accident or a copy of any report required
under this article to be filed with the department on accidents
occurring within its jurisdiction. All reports are for the confidential use of t h e municipal department and are subject to
Section 41-6-40.
1987
ARTICLES
DRIVING WHILE INTOXICATED AND RECKLESS
DRIVING
41-6-43.

Local D U I a n d related o r d i n a n c e s and reckl e s s d r i v i n g o r d i n a n c e s — Consistent w i t h

code.
(1) An ordinance adopted by a local authority that governs
a person's operating or being in actual physical control of a
niotor vehicle while having alcohol in the blood or while under
the influence of alcohol or any drug or the combined influence
of alcohol and any drug, or that governs, in relation to any of
those matters, the use of a chemical test or chemical tests, or
evidentiary presumptions, or penalties, or that governs any
combination of those matters, shall be consistent with the
provisions m this code which govern those matters.
(2) An ordinance adopted by a local authority that governs
reckless driving, or operating a vehicle in willful or wanton
disregard for the safety of persons or property shall be
consistent with the provisions of this code which govern those
inatters.
1987
41-6-43.10.

Repealed.

1985

41-6-44. Driving under the influence of alcohol, drugs,
or with specified or unsafe blood alcohol concentration — Measurement of blood or breath
alcohol — Criminal punishment — Arrest
without warrant — Penalties — Suspension
or revocation of license — Penalties.
(1) (a) A person may not operate or be in actual physical
control of a vehicle within this state if the person:
(i) has a blood or breath alcohol concentration of
08 grams or greater as shown by a chemical test
given within two hours after the alleged operation or
physical control; or
(li) is under the influence of alcohol, any drug, or
the combined influence of aicohoi and any drug to a
degree that renders the person incapable of safely
operating a vehicle.
(b) The fact that a person charged with violating this
section is or has been legally entitled to use alcohol or a
drug is not a defense against any charge of violating this
section
(2) Alcohol concentration in the blood shall be based upon
grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters of blood, and alcohol
concentration in the breath shall be based upon grams of
alcohol per 210 liters of breath
(3) (a) A person convicted the first or second time of a
violation of Subsection (1) is guilty of a*
(l) class B misdemeanor; or
(n) class A misdemeanor if the person:
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(A) has also inflicted bodily injury upon another as a proximate result of having operated
the vehicle in a negligent manner; or
IB) had a passenger under lfc years of age in
the vehicle at the time of the offense.
(b) In this section, the standard of negligence is that of
simple negligence, the failure to exercise that degree of
care that an ordinarily reasonable and prudent person
exercises under like or similar circumstances.
(c) In this section, a reference to this section includes
any similar local ordinance adopted in compliance with
Section 41-6-43.
(4) (a) As part of any sentence imposed the court shall
upon a first conviction, impose a mandatory jail sentence
of not less than 48 consecutive hours nor more than 240
hours.
(b) The court may, as an alternative to jail, require the
person to work in a community-service work program for
not less than 24 hours nor more than 50 hours.
(c) (i) In addition to the jail sentence or communityservice work program, the court shall order the
person to participate in an assessment and educational series at a licensed alcohol or drug dependency
rehabilitation facility, as appropriate.
(ii) For a violation committed after July 1, 1993,
the court may order the person to obtain treatment at
an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility
if the licensed alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation fecftfty dfcteTT&infes that thfe pfeTson has a prohiem
condition involving alcohol or drugs.
(5) (a) Upon a second conviction for a violation committed
within six years of a prior violation under this section the
court shall as part of any sentence impose a mandatory
jail sentence of not less than 240 consecutive hours nor
more than 720 hours.
(b) The court may, as an alternative to jail, require the
person to work in a community-service work program for
not less than 80 hours nor more than 240 hours.
(c) In addition to the jail sentence or communityservice work program, the court shall order the person to
participate in an assessment and educational series at a
licensed alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility, as appropriate. The court may, in its discretion, order
the person to obtain treatment at an alcohol or drug
dependency rehabilitation facility.
(6) (a) A third conviction for a violation committed within
six years of two prior violations under this section is a:
(i) class B misdemeanor except as provided in
Subsections (ii) and (7); and
(ii) class A misdemeanor if both of the prior convictions are for violations committed after April 23,
1990.
(b) (i) Under Subsection (a)(i) the court shall as part of
any sentence impose a mandatory jail sentence of not
\ess than lib noT more than %\W> houTB.
(ii) The court may, as an alternative to jail, require
the person to work in a community-service work
program for not less than 240 nor more than 720
hours.
(iii) In addition to the jail sentence or communityservice work program, the court shall order the
person to obtain treatment at an alcohol or drug
dependency rehabilitation facility, as appropriate.
(c) (i) Under Subsection (aXii) the court shall as part of
any sentence impose a fine of not less than $1,000 and
impose a mandatory jail sentence of not less than 720
hours nor more than 2,160 hours.
(ii) The court may, as an alternative to jail, require
the person to work in a community-service work

MUiUK vu.nioii.&a
program for not less than 240 nor more than 720
hours, but only if the court enters in writing on the
record the reason it finds the defendant should not
serve the jail sentence. Enrollment in and completion
of an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation program approved by the court may be a sentencing
alternative to incarceration or community service if
the program provides intensive care or inpatient
treatment and long-term closely supervised follow
through after the treatment.
(iii) In addition to the jail sentence or communityservice work program, the court shall order the
person to obtain treatment at an alcohol or drug
dependency rehabilitation facility.
(7) (a) A fourth or subsequent conviction for a violation
committed within six years of the prior violations under
this section is a third degree felony if at least three prior
convictions are for violations committed after April 23,
1990.
(b) The court shall as part of any sentence impose a fine
of not less than $1,000 and impose a mandatory jail
sentence of not less than 720 hours nor more than 2,160
hours.
(c) (i) The court may, as an alternative to jail, require
the person to work in a community-service work
program for not less than 240 nor more than 720
hours, but only if the court enters in writing on the
record the reason it finds the defendant should not
serve the jail sentence.
(ii) Enrollment in and completion of an alcohol or
drug dependency rehabilitation program approved by
the court may be a sentencing alternative to incarceration or community service if the program provides intensive care or inpatient treatment and longterm closely supervised follow through after the
treatment.
(d) In addition to the jail sentence or communityservice work program, the court shall order the person to
obtain treatment at an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility.
(8) (a) The mandatory portion of any sentence required
under this section may not be suspended and the convicted person is not eligible for parole or probation until
any sentence imposed under this section has been served.
Probation or parole resulting from a conviction for a
violation under this section may not be terminated.
(b) The department may not reinstate any license suspended or revoked as a result of the conviction under this
section, until the convicted person has furnished evidence
satisfactory to the department that:
(i) all required alcohol or drug dependency assessment, education, treatment, and rehabilitation ordered for a violation committed after July 1, 1993,
have been completed;
(ii) all fines and fees including fees for restitution
and rehabilitation costs assessed against the person
have been paid, if the conviction is a second or
subsequent conviction for a violation committed
within six years of a prior violation; and
(iii) the person does not use drugs in any abusive
or illegal manner as certified by a licensed alcohol or
drug dependency rehabilitation facility, if the conviction is for a third or subsequent conviction for a
violation committed within six years of two prior
violations committed after July 1, 1993.
(9) (a) (i) The provisions in Subsections (4), (5), (6), and (7)
that require a sentencing court to order a convicted
person to: participate in an assessment and educational series at a licensed alcohol or drug dependency

•*A-VF-*«-*

rehabilitation facility; obtain, in the discretion of the
court, treatment at an alcohol or drug dependency
rehabilitation facility; obtain, mandatorily, treatment
at an alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation facility; or do any combination of those things, apply to a
conviction for a violation of Section 41-6-45 that
qualifies as a prior conviction under Subsection (10).
(ii) The court shall render the same order regarding education or treatment at an alcohol or drug
dependency rehabilitation facility, or both, in connection with a first, second, or subsequent conviction
under Section 41-6-45 that qualifies as a prior conviction under Subsection (10), as the court would render
in connection with applying respectively, the first,
second, or subsequent conviction requirements of
Subsections (4), (5), (6), and (7).
(b) For purposes of determining whether a conviction
under Section 41-6-45 that qualified as a prior conviction
under Subsection (10), is a first, second, or subsequent
conviction under this subsection, a previous conviction
under either this section or Section 41-6-45 is considered
a prior conviction.
(c) Any alcohol or drug dependency rehabilitation prog r a m e d any community-based or other education program provided for in this section shall be approved by the
Department of Human Services.
(10) (a) (i) When the prosecution agrees to a plea of guilty
or no contest to a charge of a violation of Section
41-6-45 or of an ordinance enacted under Section
41-6-43 in satisfaction of, or as a substitute for, an
original charge of a violation of this section, the
prosecution shall state for the record a factual basis
for the plea, including whether or not there had been
consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of
both, by the defendant in connection with the violation.
(ii) The statement is an offer of proof of the facts
that shows whether there was consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of both, by the defendant,
in connection with the violation.
(b) (i) The court shall advise the defendant before
accepting the plea offered under this subsection of the
consequences of a violation of Section 41-6-45 as
follows.
(ii) If the court accepts the defendant's plea of
guilty or no contest to a charge of violating Section
41-6-45, and the prosecutor states for the record that
there was consumption of alcohol, drugs, or a combination of both, by the defendant in connection with
the violation, the resulting conviction is a prior conviction for the purposes of Subsections (5), (6), and
(7).
(c) The court shall notify the department of each conviction of Section 41-6-45 that is a prior offense for the
purposes of Subsections (5), (6), and (7).
(11) A peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person
for a violation of this section when the officer has probable
cause to believe the violation has occurred, although not in his
presence, and if the officer has probable cause to believe that
the violation was committed by the person.
(12) (a) The Department of Public Safety shall:
(l) suspend for 90 days the operator's license of a
person convicted for the first time under Subsection
(1); and
(ii) revoke for one year the license of a person
convicted of any subsequent offense under Subsection
(1) if the violation is committed within a period of six
years from the date of the prior violation.

41-6-44.1

MOTOR VEHICLES

(b) The department shall subtract from any suspension
or revocation period the number of days for which a
license was previously suspended under Section 53-3-223,
if the previous suspension was based on the same occurrence upon which the recqrd of conviction is based. 1994
41-6-44.1. Procedures— Acjjudicative proceedings.
The Department of Public Safety shall comply with the
procedures and requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, in its
adjudicative proceedings.
1987
41-6-44.2. Repealed.

1983

41-6-44.3. Standards for chemical breath analysis —
Evidence.
(1) The <x>inmissioner of the Department of Public Safety
shall establish standards for the administration and interpretation of chemical analysis of a person's breath, including
standards of training.
(2) In any action or proceeding in which it is material to
prove that a person was operating or in actual physical control
of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or any drug or
operating with a blood or breath alcohol content statutorily
prohibited, documents offered as memoranda or records of
acts, conditions, or events to prove that the analysis was made
and the instrument used was accurate, according to standards
established in Subsection (1), are admissible if:
(a) the judge finds that they were made in the regular
course of the investigation at or about the time of the act,
condition, or event; and
(b) the source of information from which made and the
method and circumstances of their preparation indicate
their trustworthiness.
(3) If the judge finds that the standards established under
Subsection (1) and the conditions of Subsection (2) have been
met, there is a presumption that the test results are valid and
further foundation for introduction of the evidence is unnec1987
essary.
41-6-44.4. Person u n d e r 21 may not operate vehicle
with detectable alcohol in body — Chemical
test procedures — Temporary license — Hearing a n d decision — Suspension of license or
operating privilege — Fees — Judicial review.
(1) (a) As used in this section "local substance abuse authority* has the same meaning as provided in Section
62A-8-101.
(b) Calculations of blood, breath, or urine alcohol concentration under this section shall be made in accordance
with the procedures in Subsection 41-6-44(2).
(2) (a) A person younger than 21 years of age may not
operate or be in actual physical control of a vehicle with
any measurable blood, breath, or urine alcohol concentration in his body as shown by a chemical test.
(b) (i) A person with a valid operator license who
violates Subsection (a), in addition to any other
applicable penalties arising out of the incident, shall
have his operator license denied or suspended as
provided in Subsection (ii).
(ii) (A) For a first offense under Subsection (a), the
Driver License Division of the Department of
Public Safety shall deny the person's operator
license if ordered or not challenged under this
section for a period of 90 days beginning on the
30th day after the date of the arrest under
Section 32A-12-209.
(B) For a second or subsequent offense under
Subsection (a), within three years of a prior
denial or suspension, the Driver License Division
shall suspend the person's operator license for a
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period of one year beginning on the 30th day
after the date of arrest,
(c) (i) A person who has not been issued an operator
license who violates Subsection (a), in addition to any
other penalties arising out of the incident, shall be
punished as provided in Subsection (ii).
(ii) For one year or until he is 17, whichever is
longer, a person may not operate a vehicle and the
Driver License Division may not issue the person an
operator license or learner's permit.
^
(3) (a) When a peace officer has reasonable grounds to
believe that a person may be violating or has violated
Subsection (2), the peace officer may, in connection with
arresting the person for a violation of Section 32A-12-209*
request that the person submit to a chemical test or tests
to be administered in compliance with the standards
under Section 41-6-44.10.
>
(b) The peace officer shall advise a person prior to the
person's submission to a chemical test that a test result
indicating a violation of Subsection (2Xa) will result in
denial or suspension of the person's license to operate a
motor vehicle or a refusal to issue a license.
(c) If the person submits to a chemical test and the test
results indicate a blood, breath, or urine alcohol content
in violation of Subsection (2)(a), or if the officer makes a
determination, based on reasonable grounds, that the"
person is otherwise in violation of Subsection (2Xa), the
officer directing administration of the test or making the'
determination shall serve on the person, on behalf of the
Driver License Division, immediate notice of the Driver
License Division's intention to deny or suspend the person's license to operate a vehicle or refusal to issue a
license under Subsection (2).
';
(4) When the officer serves immediate notice on behalf of
r
the Driver License Division, he shall:
*
(a) take the Utah license certificate or permit, if any, of
the operator;
(b) issue a temporary license certificate effective for
only 29 days if the driver had a valid operator's license;
and
*
(c) supply to the operator, on a form to be approved by
the Driver License Division, basic information regarding
how to obtain a prompt hearing before the Driver License
Division.
O
(5) A citation issued by the officer may, if approved as'fy
form by the Driver License Division, serve also as the tempo^
rary license certificate under Subsection (4)(b).
^
(6) The peace officer serving the notice shall send to the*
Driver License Division within five days after the date of
arrest and service of the notice:
<J |
(a) the person's driver license certificate, if any; -s|
(b) a copy of the citation issued for the offense;
$|
(c) a signed report on a form approved by the Driver
License Division indicating the chemical test results, ui
any; and
1
(d) any other basis for the officer's determination that*
the person has violated Subsection (2).
; j |
(7) (a) (i) Upon written request, the Driver License Oiw
sion shall grant to the person an opportunity to W^
heard within 29 days after the date of arrest undefj
Section 32A-12-209.
*m
(ii) The request shall be made within ten daysfl
the date of the arrest.
'3
(b) A hearing, if held, shall be before the Driver Li<#*?|
Division in the county in which the arrest occaX^jji
unless the Driver License Division and the person fl#*|
that the hearing may be held in some other county, j f
(c) The hearing shall be documented and shall cQl$4
the issues of:

_
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53-3-226. Grounds for confiscation of licenses, plates,
and other articles issued by state — Additional fee for reinstatement.
(1) (a) The division, any peace officer acting in his official
capacity, or a person authorized under Subsection (2) may
take possession of any certificate of title, registration
card, decal, permit, license certificate, registration plate,
or any other article issued by the state:
(i) upon expiration, denial, suspension, disqualification, revocation, alteration, or cancellation of it;
(ii) that is fictitious;
(iii) that has been unlawfully or erroneously issued; or
(iv) that is unlawfully or erroneously displayed,
(b) A receipt shall be issued that describes each confiscated item.
(2) The division may enter into contractual agreements
with constables or other law enforcement agencies to facilitate
confiscation of items listed in Subsection (1) if a person fails or
refuses to surrender any of those documents to the division
upon demand.
(3) The division shall assess against a person making an
application referred to in Subsection 53-3-205(14), in addition
to any fee imposed under Subsection 53-3-205(14), a fee under
Section 53-3-105, which shall be paid before the 1 person's
driving privilege is reinstated, to cover the costs required to
serve orders related to the purposes of Subsection (2)
1993
53-3-227. Driving a motor vehicle prohibited while
license denied, suspended, disqualified, or revoked — Penalties.
(1) A person whose license has been denied, suspended,
disqualified, or revoked under this chapter or under the laws
of the state in which his license was issued and who drives any
motor vehicle upon the highways of this state while that
license is denied, suspended, disqualified, or revoked shall be
punished as provided in this section.
(2) A person convicted of a violation of Subsection (1), other
than a violation specified in Subsection (3), is guilty of a class
C misdemeanor.
(3) (a) A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor whose
conviction under Subsection (1) is based on his driving a
motor vehicle while his license is suspended, disqualified,
or revoked for:
(i) a refusal to submit to a chemical test under
Section 41-6-44.10;
(ii) a violation of Section 41-6-44;
(iii) a violation of a local ordinance that complies
with the requirements of Section 41-6-43;
(iv) a violation of Section 41-6-44.6;
(v) a violation of Section 76-5-207;
(vi) a criminal action that the person plead guilty
to as a result of a plea bargain after having been
originally charged with violating one or more of the
sections or ordinances under this subsection;
(vii) a revocation or suspension which has been
extended under Subsection 53-3-220 (2); or
(viii) where disqualification is the result of driving
a commercial motor vehicle while the person's CDL is
disqualified, suspended, canceled, or revoked under
Subsection 53-3-414(1).
(b) A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor whose
conviction under Subsection (1) is based upon his driving
a motor vehicle while his license is suspended, disqualified, or revoked in his state of licensure for violations
corresponding to the violations listed in Subsection (a).
(c) A fine imposed under this subsection shall be at
least the maximum fine for a class C misdemeanor under
Section 76-3-301.
1994
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53-3-228. M a k i n g false affidavit i s perjury.
A person who makes any false affidavit or knowingl
or affirms falsely, to any matter or thing required UE
chapter to be sworn to or affirmed, is guilty of perjury

53-3-229. Prohibited uses of license certificate
alty.
It is a class C misdemeanor for a person to:
(1) display, cause or permit to be displayed, or
in possession any license certificate knowing it is f
or has been canceled, denied, revoked, suspend
qualified, or altered;
(2) lend or knowingly permit the use of a
certificate issued to him, by a person not entitled
(3) display or to represent as his own a license
cate not issued to him;
(4) fail or refuse to surrender to the divisioi
demand any license certificate that has been
suspended, disqualified, canceled, or revoked;
(5) use a false name or give a false address
application for a license or any renewal or duplicate
license certificate, or to knowingly make a false
ment, or to knowingly conceal a material fact or oth
commit a fraud in the application; or
(6) permit any other prohibited use of a license
cate issued to him.
53-3-230. Violation of part — Misdemeanor.
A violation of this part is a class C misdemeanor,
otherwise specified.
PART 3
IMPAIRED PERSONS LICENSING
53-3-301. Short title.
This part is known as the "Impaired Persons Licensing
53-3-302. Definitions.
As used in this part:
(1) "Board" means the Driver License Medical Ad^
Board created in Section 53-3-303.
(2) "Health care professional" means a physici
surgeon licensed to practice medicine in the sta
when recommended by the Medical Advisory Board
include other health care professionals licensed to co
physical examinations in this state.
.
(3) (a) "Impaired person" means a person who "
mental, emotional, or nonstable physical disabi
disease that may impair the person's ability to
cise reasonable and ordinary control at all time
a motor vehicle while driving on the highways
(b) "Impaired person" does not include a p
having a nonprogressive or stable physical ir
ment that is objectively observable and that no.
evaluated by a functional driving examination. "
53-3-303. Driver License Medical Advisory Boa
Membership — Guidelines for licensini
paired persons — Recommendations to
sion.
(1) There is created within the division the Driver Li
Medical Advisory Board.
(2) (a) The board is comprised of three regular meif
appointed by the executive director of the Departm
Health.
(b) The board shall be assisted by expert panel
bers nominated by the board as necessary and fc
proved by the executive director of the Departm*
Health.
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ffl-S-104. M i s d e m e a n o r s classified.
ft)" Misdemeanors are classified into three categories:
(a) Class A misdemeanors;
(b) Class B misdemeanors;
(c) Class C misdemeanors.
f2) An offense designated a misdemeanor, either in this
or in another law, without specification as to punishment
; \
^category, [s a class B misdemeanor.
1973
L-3-105. Infractions.
ill) Infractions are not classified.
I$2) Any offense which is an infraction within this code is
Sn>ressly designated and any offense defined outside this code
Pj*jch is not designated as a felony or misdemeanor and for
which no penalty is specified is an infraction.
1978
PART 2
SENTENCING
HJ-3-201. S e n t e n c e s or c o m b i n a t i o n o f s e n t e n c e s all o w e d — Civil p e n a l t i e s — R e s t i t u t i o n —
H e a r i n g — Definitions — R e s e n t e n c i n g — Agg r a v a t i o n or m i t i g a t i o n of c r i m e s w i t h m a n datory s e n t e n c e s [Effective u n t i l April 29,
1996].
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Conviction" includes a:
(i) judgment of guilt; and
(ii) plea of guilty.
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the
defendant is convicted or any other criminal conduct for
which the defendant admits responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of committing the
criminal conduct.
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages,
but not general damages, which a person could recover
against the defendant in a civil action arising out of the
facts or events constituting the defendant's criminal activities and includes the money equivalent of property
taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses
including earnings and medical expenses.
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary damages to a victim, including the
accrual of interest from the time of sentencing, insured
damages, and payment for expenses to a governmental
entity for extradition or transportation and as further
defined in Subsection (4)(c).
(e) (i) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has suffered pecuniary damages as a result
of the defendant's criminal activities.
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant in
the defendant's criminal activities.
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may
•entence a person convicted of an offense to any one of the
Mowing sentences or combination of them:
(a) to pay a fine;
(b) to removal from or disqualification of public or
private office;
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided
by law;
(d) to imprisonment;
(e) to life imprisonment;
(f) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison without
parole; or
(g) to death.
w) (a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority
conferred by law to:
(i) forfeit property;
(ii) dissolve a corporation;

v

•

(iii) suspend or cancel a license;
(iv) permit removal of a person from office;
(v) cite for contempt; or
(vi) impose any other civil penalty,
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence.
(4) (a) (i) When a person is convicted of criminal activity
t h a t has resulted in pecuniary damages, in addition
to any other sentence it may impose, the court shall
order t h a t the defendant make restitution to victims
of crime as provided in this subsection, or for conduct
for which the defendant h a s agreed to make restitution as part of a plea agreement. For purposes of
restitution, a victim has the meaning as defined in
Section 77-38-2 and family member has the meaning
as defined in Section 77-37-2.
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall follow the criteria and procedures
as provided in Subsections (4Xc) and (4Xd).
(iii) If the court finds the defendant owes restitution, the clerk of the court shall enter an order of
complete restitution as defined in Subsection (8)(b) on
the civil judgment docket and provide notice of the
order to the parties.
(iv) The order is considered a legal judgment enforceable under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
and the person in whose favor the restitution order is
entered may seek enforcement of the restitution
order in accordance with the U t a h Rules of Civil
Procedure. In addition, the Department of Corrections may, on behalf of the person in whose favor the
restitution order is entered, enforce the restitution
order as judgment creditor under the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
(v) If the defendant fails to obey a court order for
payment of restitution and the victim or department
elects to pursue collection of the order by civil process,
the victim shall be entitled to recover reasonable
attorney's fees.
(vi) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a
lien when recorded in a judgment docket and shall
have the same effect and is subject to the same rules
as a judgment for money in a civil action. Interest
shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of
sentencing.
(b) (i) If a defendant h a s been extradited to this state
under Title 77, Chapter 30, Extradition, to resolve
pending criminal charges and is convicted of criminal
activity in the county to which he h a s been returned,
the court may, in addition to any other sentence i t
may impose, order t h a t the defendant make restitution for costs expended by any governmental entity
for the extradition.
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall consider the criteria in Subsection
(4X0.
(c) In determining restitution, t h e court shall determine complete restitution and court-ordered restitution.
(i) Complete restitution m e a n s t h e restitution necessary to compensate a victim for all losses caused by
t h e defendant.
(ii) Court-ordered restitution means the restitution the court having criminal jurisdiction orders the
defendant to pay as a p a r t of the criminal sentence a t
the time of sentencing.
(iii) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be determined as provided in Subsection
(8).
(d) (i) If the court determines t h a t restitution is appropriate or inappropriate under this subsection, the
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court shall make the reasons for the decision a part of
the court record.
(ii) In any civil action brought by a victim to
enforce the judgment, the defendant shall be entitled
to offset any amounts that have been paid as part of
court-ordered restitution to the victim.
(iii) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a
lien when recorded in a judgment docket and shall
have the same effect and is subject to the same rules
as a judgment for money in a civil action. Interest
shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of
sentencing.
(e) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount,
or distribution of the restitution, the court shall at the
time of sentencing allow the defendant a full hearing on
the issue.
(5) (a) In addition to any other sentence the court may
impose, the court shall order the defendant to pay restitution of governmental transportation expenses if the
defendant was:
(i) transported pursuant to court order from one
county to another within the state at governmental
expense to resolve pending criminal charges;
(ii) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C
misdemeanor; and
(iii) convicted of a crime.
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay
restitution of governmental transported-'on expenses if
any of the following apply:
(i) the defendant is charged with an infraction or
on a subsequent failure to appear a warrant is issued
fox an ixtfrartioir, OT
(ii) the defendant was not transported pursuant to
a court order.
(c) (i) Restitution of governmental transportation expenses under Subsection (a)(i) shall be calculated
according to the following schedule:
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is
transported;
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is
transported;
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is
transported.
(ii) The schedule of restitution under Subsection
(c)(i) applies to each defendant transported regardless of the number of defendants actually transported
in a single trip.
(6) (a) If a statute under which the defendant was convicted mandates that one of three stated minimum terms
shall be imposed, the court shall order imposition of the
term of middle severity unless there are circumstances in
aggravation or mitigation of the crime.
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either party
may submit a statement identifying circumstances in
aggravation or mitigation or presenting additional facts.
If the statement is in writing, it shall be filed with the
court and served on the opposing party at least four days
priot to tVve tixofc set for se^teftcmg.
(c) In determining whether there are circumstances
that justify imposition of the highest or lowest term, the
court may consider the record in the case, the probation
officer's report, other reports, including reports received
under Section 76-3-404, statements in aggravation or
mitigation submitted by the prosecution or the defendant,
and any further evidence introduced at the sentencing
hearing.
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts
supporting and reasons for imposing the upper or lower
term.

(e) The court in determining a just sentence shall
consider sentencing guidelines regarding aggravation and
mitigation promulgated by the Commission on Criminal
and Juvenile Justice.
(7) (a) (i) If a defendant subject to Subsection (6) has been
sentenced and committed to the Utah State Prison
the court may, within 120 days of the date of commitment on its own motion, or at any time upon the
recommendation of the Board of Pardons and Parole
recall the sentence and commitment previously ordered and resentence the defendant in the same
manner as if the defendant had not previously been
sentenced, so long as the new sentence is no greater
than the initial sentence nor less than the mandatory
time prescribed by statute.
(ii) The resentencing shall take into consideration
the sentencing guidelines established under this section by the Commission on Criminal and Juvenile
Justice to eliminate disparity of sentences and to
promote uniformity of sentencing,
(iii) Credit shall be given for time served.
(b) (i) The court shall state the reasons for its choice of
sentence on the record at the time of sentencing.
(n) The court shall also inform the defendant as
part of the sentence that, if the defendant is released
from prison, the defendant may be on parole for a
period of ten years.
(c) If during the commission of a crime described as
child kidnaping, rape of a child, object rape of a child,
sodomy upon a child, or sexual abuse of a child, the
defendant causes substantial bodily injury to the child,
and ii the chaTge is set ioTth in the information or
indictment and admitted by the defendant, or found true
by a judge or jury at trial, the defendant shall be sentenced to the aggravated mandatory term in state prison.
This subsection takes precedence over any conflicting
provision of law.
(#) (a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an
offense, the offense shall include any criminal conduct
admitted by the defendant to the sentencing court or to
which the defendant agrees to pay restitution. A victim of
an offense, that involves as an element a scheme, a
conspiracy, or a pattern of criminal activity, includes any
person directly harmed by the defendant's criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern.
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete restitution, the court shall consider all
relevant facts, including:
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense
resulted in damage to or loss or destruction of property of a victim of the offense;
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services and devices relating to physical,
psychiatric, and psychological care, including nonmedical care and treatment rendered in accordance
with a method of healing recognized by the law of the
place of treatment; the cost of necessary physical and
occupational therapy and rehabilitation; and the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the
offense resulted in bodily injury to a victim; and
(iii) the cost of necessary funeral and related ser*
vices if the offense resulted in the death of a victiik
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other condi*
tions for court-ordered restitution, the court shall cofl*
sider the factors listed in Subsection (b) and:
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and tW
burden that payment of restitution will impose, wiw*
regard to the other obligations of the defendant;
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(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution
on an installment basis or on other conditions to be
fixed by the court;
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of
the payment of restitution and the method of payment; and
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines make restitution inappropriate,
(d) The court may decline to make an order or may
defer entering an order of restitution if the court determines that the complication and prolongation of the
sentencing process, as a result of considering an order of
restitution under this subsection, substantially outweighs
the need to provide restitution to the victim.
1995
Sentences or combination of sentences
allowed — Civil penalties — Restitution —
Hearing — Definitions — Resentencing — Aggravation or mitigation of crimes with mandatory sentences [Effective April 29,1996].
(1) As used in this section:
(a) "Conviction" includes a:
(i) judgment of guilt; and
(ii) plea of guilty.
(b) "Criminal activities" means any offense of
which the defendant is convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an
admission of committing the criminal conduct.
(c) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general damages, which a person could
recover against the defendant in a civil action arising
out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's
criminal activities and includes the money equivalent
of property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise
harmed, and losses including earnings and medical
expanses.
(d) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal
payment for pecuniary damages to a victim, including
the accrual of interest from the time of sentencing,
insured damages, and payment for expenses to a
governmental entity for extradition or transportation
and as further defined in Subsection (4Xc).
(e) (i) "Victim" means any person whom the court
determines has suffered pecuniary damages as a
result of the defendant's criminal activities.
(ii) "Victim" does not include any coparticipant
in the defendant's criminal activities.
(2) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court
may sentence a person convicted of an offense to any one
of the following sentences or combination of them:
(a) to pay a fine;
(b) to removal from or disqualification of public or
private office;
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law;
(d) to imprisonment;
(e) to life imprisonment;
(f) on or after April 27, 1992, to life in prison
without parole; or
(g) on or after April 29, 1996, to imprisonment at
not less than five years and which may be for life for
an offense under Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 4, and
Sections 76-5-301.1 and 76-5-302; or
(h) to death.
(3) (a) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law to:
(i) forfeit property;
(ii) dissolve a corporation;
(iii) suspend or cancel a license;

(iv) permit removal of a person from office;
(v) cite for contempt; or
(vi) impose any other civil penalty,
(b) A civil penalty may be included in a sentence.
(4) (a) (i) When a person is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in pecuniary damages, in
addition to any other sentence it may impose, the
court shall order that the defendant make restitution to victims of crime as provided in this
subsection, or for conduct for which the defendant has agreed to make restitution as part of a
plea agreement. For purposes of restitution, a
victim has the meaning as defined in Section
77-38-2 and family member has the meaning as
defined in 77-37-2.
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall follow the criteria and
procedures as provided in Subsections (4)(c) and
(4Xd).
(iii) If the court finds the defendant owes restitution, the clerk of the court shall enter an
order of complete restitution as defined in Subsection (8Kb) on the civil judgment docket and
provide notice of the order to the parties.
(iv) The order is considered a legal judgment
enforceable under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and the person in whose favor the restitution order is entered may seek enforcement of the
restitution order in accordance with the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. In addition, the Department of Corrections may, on behalf of the person
in whose favor the restitution order is entered,
enforce the restitution order as judgment creditor under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
(v) If the defendant fails to obey a court order
for payment of restitution and the victim or
department elects to pursue collection of the
order by civil process, the victim shall be entitled
to recover reasonable attorney's fees.
(vi) A judgment ordering restitution constitutes a lien when recorded in a judgment docket
and shall have the same effect and is subject to
the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil
action. Interest shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of sentencing.
(b) (i) If a defendant has been extradited to this
state under Title 77, Chapter 30, Extradition, to
resolve pending criminal charges and is convicted of criminal activity in the county to which
he has been returned, the court may, in addition
to any other sentence it may impose, order that
the defendant make restitution for costs expended by any governmental entity for the extradition.
(ii) In determining whether restitution is appropriate, the court shall consider the criteria in
Subsection (4)(c).
(c) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete restitution and court-ordered restitution.
(i) Complete restitution means the restitution
necessary to compensate a victim for all losses
caused by the defendant.
(ii) Court-ordered restitution means the restitution the court having criminal jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay as a part of the
criminal sentence at the time of sentencing.
(iii) Complete restitution and court-ordered
restitution shall be determined as provided in
Subsection (8).
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(d) (1) If the court determines that restitution is
appropriate or inappropriate under this subsection, the court shall make the reasons for the
decision a part of the court record
(n) In any civil action brought by a victim to
enforce the judgment, the defendant shall be
entitled to offset any amounts that have been
paid as part of court-ordered restitution to the
victim
(in) A judgment ordenng restitution constitutes a hen when recorded in a judgment docket
and shall have the same effect and is subject to
the same rules as a judgment for money in a civil
action Interest shall accrue on the amount ordered from the time of sentencing
(e) If the defendant objects to the imposition,
amount, or distribution of the restitution, the court
shall at the time of sentencing allow the defendant a
full hearing on the issue
(5) (a) In addition to any other sentence the court may
impose, the court shall order the defendant to pay
restitution of governmental transportation expenses
if the defendant was
(1) transported pursuant to court order from
one county to another within the state at governmental expense to resolve pending cnmmal
charges,
(n) charged with a felony or a class A, B, or C
misdemeanor, and
(in) convicted of a crime
(b) The court may not order the defendant to pay
restitution of governmental transportation expenses
if any of the following apply
(1) the defendant is charged with an infraction
or on a subsequent failure to appear a warrant is
issued for an infraction, or
(n) the defendant was not transported pursuant to a court order
(c) (1) Restitution of governmental transportation
expenses under Subsection (aXO shall be calculated according to the following schedule
(A) $75 for up to 100 miles a defendant is
transported,
(B) $125 for 100 up to 200 miles a defendant is transported, and
(C) $250 for 200 miles or more a defendant is transported
(n) The schedule of restitution under Subsection (c)(i) applies to each defendant transported
regardless of the number of defendants actually
transported in a single trip
(6) (a) If a statute under which the defendant was
convicted mandates that one of three stated minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order
imposition of the term of middle severity unless there
are circumstances in aggravation or mitigation of the
crime
(b) Pnor to or at the time of sentencing, either
party may submit a statement identifying circumstances in aggravation or mitigation or presenting
additional facts If the statement is in writing, it shall
be filed with the court and served on the opposing
party at least four days prior to the time set for
sentencing
(c) In determining whether there are circumstances that justify imposition of the highest or
lowest term, the court may consider the record in the
case, the probation officer's report, other reports,
including reports received under Section 76-3-404,
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statements in aggravation or mitigation submitted by
the prosecution or the defendant, and any further
evidence introduced at the sentencing heanng
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts
supporting and reasons for imposing the upper or
lower term
(e) The court m determining a just sentence shall
consider sentencing guidelines regarding aggravation
and mitigation promulgated by the Commission on
Cnminal and Juvenile Justice
(7) (a) d) If a defendant subject to Subsection (6) has
been sentenced and committed to the Utah State
Prison, the court may, within 120 days of the date
of commitment on its own motion, or at any tune
upon the recommendation of the Board of Pardons and Parole, recall the sentence and commitment previously ordered and resentence the defendant in the same manner as if the defendant
had not previously been sentenced, so long as the
new sentence is no greater than the initial sentence nor less than the mandatory time pre*
scribed by statute
(n) The resentencing shall take into consideration the sentencing guidelines established under this section by the Commission on Cnminal
and Juvenile Justice to eliminate disparity of
sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing
(in) Credit shall be given for time served
(b) (I) The couri shall state the reasons for its
choice of sentence on the record at the time of
sentencing
(u) The court shall also inform the defendant
as part of the sentence that, if the defendant is
released from prison, the defendant may be on
parole for a period of ten years
(8) (a) For the purpose of determining restitution for
an offense, the offense shall include any criminal
conduct admitted by the defendant to the sentencing
court or to which the defendant agrees to pay restitution A victim of an offense, that mvolves as an
element a scheme, a conspiracy, or a pattern of
cnmmal activity, mcludes any person directly
harmed by the defendant's cnmmal conduct m the
course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other
conditions for complete restitution, the court shall
consider all relevant facts, including
d) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense
resulted in damage to or loss or destruction of
property of a victim of the offense,
(n) the cost of necessary medical and related
professional services and devices relatmg to
physical, psychiatnc, and psychological care, including nonmedical care and treatment rendered
in accordance with a method of healing recognized by the law of the place of treatment; the
cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and rehabilitation, and the income lost by
the victim as a result of the offense if the offense
resulted m bodily injury to a victim, and
(in) the cost of necessary funeral and related
services if the offense resulted m the death of a
victim

(c) In determining the monetary sum and other
conditions for court-ordered restitution, the court
shall consider the factors listed m Subsection (b) and:
d) the financial resources of the defendant and
the burden that payment of restitution will tffl-
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pose, with regard to the other obligations of the
defendant;
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment basis or on other conditions to be fixed by the court;
(Hi) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant
of the payment of restitution and the method of
payment; and
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines make restitution inappropriate,
(d) The court may decline to make an order or may
defer entering an order of restitution if the court
determines t h a t the complication and prolongation of
the sentencing process, as a result of considering an
order of restitution under this subsection, substantially outweighs the need to provide restitution to the
victim.
1995 (1st as.)
76-3-201.1. N o n p a y m e n t of fine or r e s t i t u t i o n a s cont e m p t — I m p r i s o n m e n t — Relief w h e r e default n o t c o n t e m p t — Collection of default.
(1) When a defendant sentenced to pay a fine or to make
restitution defaults in the payment of any installment, the
court on motion of the prosecution, victim, or upon its own
motion may require him to show cause why his default should
not be treated as contempt of court, and may issue a show
cause citation or a w a r r a n t of arrest for his appearance.
(2) Unless the defendant shows t h a t his default was not
attributable to an intentional refusal to obey the order of the
court or to a failure on his part to make a good faith effort to
make the payment, the court may find t h a t his default
constitutes contempt and may order him committed until the
fine or the restitution, or a specified part of it, is paid.
(3) When a fine or an order of restitution is imposed on a
corporation or unincorporated association, the person authorized to make disbursement from the assets of the corporation
or association shall pay the fine or make the restitution from
those assets. His failure to do so may be held to be contempt
unless he makes the showing required in Subsection (2).
(4) The term of imprisonment for contempt for nonpayment
of fines or failure to make restitution shall be set forth in the
commitment order.
(5) If it appears to the satisfaction of the court t h a t the
default in the payment of a fine or restitution is not contempt,
the court may enter an order allowing the defendant additional time for payment, reducing the amount of the payment
or of each installment, or revoking the fine or order of
restitution or the unpaid portion in whole or in part.
(6) (a) A default in the payment of a fine or costs or failure
to make restitution or any installment may be collected by
any means authorized by law for the enforcement of a
judgment.
(b) The prosecuting attorney may collect restitution in
behalf of a victim.
(c) The levy of execution for the collection of a fine or
restitution does not discharge a defendant committed to
imprisonment for contempt until the amount of the fine or
restitution has actually been collected.
issr
76-3-201,2, Civil a c t i o n by v i c t i m for d a m a g e s .
(1) Provisions in this part concerning restitution do not
limit or impair the right of a person injured by a defendant's
criminal activities to sue and recover damages from the
defendant in a civil action. Evidence t h a t the defendant has
paid or been ordered to pay restitution under this part or
Section 77-18-1, may not be introduced in any civil action
arising out of the facts or events which were the basis for the
restitution. However, the court shall credit any restitution
paid by the defendant to a victim against any judgment in
favor of the victim in the civil action

(2) If conviction in a criminal trial necessarily decides the
issue of a defendant's liability for pecuniary damages of a
victim, that issue is conclusively determined as to the defendant if it is involved in a subsequent civil action.
1990

76-3-201.3. Minimum mandatory sentences — Effective law.
The Legislature provides that the following sections of the
Utah Code regarding minimum mandatory sentencing provisions are retained and are considered to be effective law until
April 29, 199676-3-201, as last amended by Chapters 111, 117, and 301,
Laws of Utah 1995;
76-3-406, as last amended by Chapter 64, Laws of Utah
1994;
76-5-301.1, as last amended by Chapter 18, Laws of Utah
1984;
76-5-302, as last amended by Chapter 88, Laws of Utah
1983;
76-5-402.1, as enacted by Chapter 88, Laws of Utah 1983;
76-5-402.3, as enacted by Chapter 88, Laws of Utah 1983;
76-5-403.1, as last amended by Chapter 156, Laws of Utah
1988;
76-5-404.1, as last amended by Chapter 170, Laws of Utah
1989;
76-5-405, as last amended by Chapter 170, Laws of Utah
1989;
76-5-406.5, as last amended by Chapter 64, Laws of Utah
1994; and
77-27-9, as last amended by Chapter 13, Laws of Utah 1994.
1995 (1st S.S.)

76-3-202. Paroled persons — Termination or discharge
from sentence — Time served on parole —
Discretion of Board of Pardons and Parole.
(1) Every person committed to the state prison to serve an
indeterminate term and later released on parole shall, upon
completion of three years on parole outside of confinement and
without violation, or in the case of a person convicted of
violating Section 76-5-301.1, Subsection 76-5-302(lXe), Section 76-5-402, 76-5-402.1, 76-5-402.2, 76-5-402.3, 76-5-403,
76-5-403.1, 76-5-404, 76-5-404.1, or 76-5-405, or attempting to
violate any of those sections, upon completion of ten years on
parole outside of confinement and without violation, be terminated from his sentence unless the person is earlier terminated by the Board of Pardons and Parole. Any person who
violates the terms of his parole, while serving parole, shall at
the discretion of the Board of Pardons and Parole be recommitted to prison to serve the portion of the balance of his term
as determined by the Board of Pardons and Parole, but not to
exceed the maximum term
(2) Any person paroled following a former parole revocation
may not be discharged from his sentence until either:
(a) he has served three years on parole outside of
confinement and without violation, or in the case of a
person convicted of violating Section 76-5-301.1, Subsection 76-5-302(l)(e), Section 76-5-402, 76-5-402.1, 76-5402 2, 76-5-402.3, 76-5-403, 76-5-403.1, 76-5-404, 76-5404.1, or 76-5-405, or attempting to violate any of those
sections, ten years on parole outside of confinement and
without violation;
(b) his maximum sentence has expired; or
(c) the Board of Pardons and Parole so orders.
(3) (a) All time served on parole, outside of confinement
and without violation constitutes service of the total
sentence but does not preclude the requirement of serving
a three-year or ten-year, as the case may be, parole term
outside of confinement and without violation.
(b) Any time a person spends outside of confinement
after commission of a parole violation does not constitute
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(a) third degree felony shall be as if the conviction were
for a first degree felony;
(b) second degree felony shall be as if the conviction
were for a first degree felony; or
(c) first degree felony shall remain the penalty for a
first degree penalty except:
(i) the convicted person is not eligible for probation; and
(ii) the Board of Pardons and Parole shall consider
that the convicted person is a habitual violent offender as an aggravating factor to determine the
length of incarceration.
(4) (a) In all cases, notice that the prosecution intends to
seek punishment as a habitual violent offender under this
section shall be provided in writing and shall be served
upon the defendant or his attorney not later than ten days
prior to trial. Notice shall include the case number, court,
and date of conviction or commitment of any case relied
upon by the prosecution.
(b) (i) The defendant shall serve notice in writing upon
the prosecutor if the defendant intends to deny that:
(A) the defendant is the person who was convicted or committed;
(B) the defendant was represented by counsel
or had waived counsel; or
(C) the defendant's plea was understanding^
or voluntarily entered.
(ii) The notice of denial shall be served not later
than five days prior to trial and shall state in detail
the defendant's contention regarding the previous
conviction and commitment.
(c) The court shall determine if this section applies
prior to or at the time of sentencing. The court shall
consider any evidence presented at trial and a shall afford
the prosecution and the defendant an opportunity to
present any necessary additional evidence. Prior to sentencing under this section, the court shall determine
whether this section is applicable by a preponderance of
the evidence.
(d) If any previous conviction and commitment is based
upon a plea of guilty or no contest, there is a rebuttable
presumption that the conviction and commitment were
regular and lawful in all respects if the conviction and
commitment occurred after January 1, 1970. If the conviction and commitment occurred prior to January 1,
1970, the burden is on the prosecution to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was
then represented by counsel or had lawfully waived his
right to have counsel present, and that his plea was
understandingly and voluntarily entered.
(e) If the court finds this section applicable, it shall
enter that specific finding on the record and shall indicate
in the order of judgment and commitment that the defendant has been found by the court to be a habitual violent
offender and is sentenced under this section.
(5) The habitual violent offender provisions of this section
are not an element of the offense, and proof of a defendant's
conduct as a habitual violent offender is not necessary at a
preliminary hearing or at trial.
(6) (a) The sentencing enhancement provisions of Sections
76-3-407 and 76-3-408 shall apply to a felony conviction
defined in Title 76, Chapter 5, Part 4, Sexual Offenses,
and shall supersede the provisions of this section.
(b) Notwithstanding Subsection (6)(a):
(i) the convictions under Sections 76-5-404 and
76-5a-3 shall be governed by the enhancement provisions of this section; and
(ii) the "violent felony" offense defined in Subsection (l)(c) shall include any felony sexual offense

violation of Title 76, Chapter 5, P a r t 4, Sexual Offenses, to determine if the convicted person is a
habitual violent offender.
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76-3-204. Misdemeanor conviction — Term of imprisonment.
A person who has been convicted of a misdemeanor may be
sentenced to imprisonment as follows:
(1) In the case of a class A misdemeanor, for a term not
exceeding one year;
(2) In the case of a class B misdemeanor, for a term not
exceeding six months;
(3) In the case of a class C misdemeanor, for a term not
exceeding ninety days.
1973

76-3-205. Infraction conviction — Fine, forfeiture, and
disqualification.
(1) A person convicted of an infraction may not be imprisoned but may be subject to a fine, forfeiture, and disqualification, or any combination.
(2) Whenever a person is convicted of an infraction and no
punishment is specified, the person may be fined as for a class
C misdemeanor.
1973

76-3-206. Capital felony — Penalties.
(1) A person who has pled guilty to or been convicted of a
capital felony shall be sentenced in accordance with Section
76-3-207. That sentence shall be death, life imprisonment, or,
on or after April 27, 1992, life in prison without parole.
(2) The judgment of conviction and sentence of death shall
be subject to automatic review by the Utah State Supreme
Court within 60 days after certification by the sentencing
court of the entire record unless time is extended an additional
period not to exceed 30 days by the Utah State Supreme Court
for good cause shown. Such review by the Utah State Supreme
Court shall have priority over all other cases and shall be
heard in accordance with rules promulgated by the Utah State
Supreme CGU..
1992
76-3-207. Capital felony — Sentencing proceeding.
(1) When a defendant has pled guilty to or been found
guilty of a capital felony, there shall be further proceedings
before the court or jury on the issue of sentence. In the case of
a plea of guilty to a capital felony, the sentencing proceedings
shall be conducted by the court which accepted the plea or by
a jury upon request of the defendant. When a defendant has
been found guilty of a capital felony, the proceedings shall be
conducted before the court or jury which found the defendant
guilty, provided the defendant may waive hearing before the
jury, in which event the hearing shall be before the court. If,
however, circumstances make it impossible or impractical to
reconvene the same jury for the sentencing proceedings the
court may dismiss that jury and convene a new jury for such
proceedings. If a retrial of the sentencing proceedings is
necessary as a consequence of a remand from an appellate
court, the sentencing authority shall be determined as provided in Subsection (4).
(2) (a) In capital sentencing proceedings, evidence may be
presented on:
(i) the nature and circumstances of the crime;
(ii) the defendant's character, background, history,
mental and physical condition;
(iii) the victim and the impact of the crime on the
victim's family and community without comparison to
other persons or victims; and
(iv) any other facts in aggravation or mitigation of
the penalty that the court considers relevant to the
sentence.
(b) Any evidence the court considers to have probative
force may be received regardless of its admissibility under
the exclusionary rules of evidence. The state's attorney
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and the defendant shall be permitted to present argument
for or against sentence of death.
(3) Aggravating circumstances shall include those outlined
in Section 76-5-202. Mitigating circumstances shall include:
(a) the defendant has no significant history of prior
criminal activity;
(b) the homicide was committed while the defendant
was under the influence of extreme mental or emotional
disturbance;
(c) the defendant acted under extreme duress or under
the substantial domination of another person;
(d) at the time of the homicide, the capacity of the
defendant to appreciate the wrongfulness of his conduct
or to conform his conduct to the requirement of law was
substantially impaired as a result of mental disease,
intoxication, or influence of drugs;
(e) the youth of the defendant at the time of the crime;
(f) the defendant was an accomplice in the homicide
committed by another person and his participation was
relatively minor; and
(g) any other fact in mitigation of the penalty.
(4) The court or jury, as the case may be, shall retire to
Consider the penalty. In all proceedings before a jury, under
this section, it shall be instructed as to the punishment to be
imposed upon a unanimous verdict for death and that the
Penalty of either life in prison or with regard to sentences to be
imposed on or after April 27, 1992, life in prison without
Parole, shall be imposed if a unanimous verdict for death is not
found. If the jury reports unanimous agreement to impose the
sentence of death, the court shall discharge the jury and shall
impose the sentence of death. If the jury is unable to reach a
Unanimous verdict imposing the sentence of death, with
regard to sentences to be imposed on or after April 27, 1992,
the court shall instruct the jury to determine by a unanimous
vote whether the penalty of life in prison without parole shall
he imposed. If the jury is unable to reach a verdict, the court
shall discharge the jury and impose the sentence of life
imprisonment.
(5) Upon any appeal by the defendant where the sentence is
of death, the appellate court, if it finds prejudicial error in the
sentencing proceeding only, may set aside the sentence of
death and remand the case to the trial court for new sentencing proceedings to the extent necessary to correct the error or
errors. No error in the sentencing proceedings shall result in
the reversal of the conviction of a capital felony. In cases of
remand for new sentencing proceedings, all exhibits and a
transcript of all testimony and other evidence properly admitted in the prior trial and sentencing proceedings shall be
admissible in the new sentencing proceedings, and if the
sentencing proceeding was before a:
(a) jury, a new jury shall be impaneled for the new
sentencing proceeding;
(b) judge, the original trial judge shall conduct the new
sentencing proceeding; or
(c) judge, and the original trial judge is unable or
unavailable to conduct a new sentencing proceeding, then
another judge shall be designated to conduct the new
sentencing proceeding.
(6) In the event the death penalty is held to be unconstitutional by the Utah Supreme Court or the United States
Supreme Court, the court having jurisdiction over a person
Previously sentenced to death for a capital felony shall cause
such person to be brought before the court, and the court shall
sentence the person to life in prison, if the death penalty is
held unconstitutional prior to April 27, 1992. or life in prison
without parole if the death penalty is held unconstitutional on
or after April 27, 1992, and any person who is thereafter
convicted of a capital felony shall be sentenced to life in prison
or life in prison without parole.
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76-3-207.5. Applicability — Effect o n s e n t e n c i n g — Opt i o n s of offenders.
(1) The sentencing option of life without parole provided in
Sections 76-3-201 and 76-3-207 applies only to those capital
offenses for which the offender is sentenced on or after April
27,1992. The sentencing option of fife without parofe provided
in Sections 76-3-201 and 76-3-207 has no effect on sentences
imposed in capital cases prior to April 27, 1992.
(2) An offender, who commits a capital offense prior to April
27, 1992, but is sentenced on or after April 27, 1992, shall be
given the option, prior to a sentencing hearing pursuant to
Section 76-3-207, to proceed either under the law which was in
effect at the time the offense was committed or under the
additional sentencing option of life in prison without parole
Provided in Sections 76-3-201 and 76-3-207.
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76-3-208. I m p r i s o n m e n t — Custodial a u t h o r i t i e s .
(1) Persons sentenced to imprisonment shall be committed
to the following custodial authorities:
(a) felony commitments shall be to the Utah State
Prison;
(b) (i) class A misdemeanor commitments shall be to
the jail, or other facility designated by the town, city,
or county where the defendant was convicted, unless
the defendant consents to commitment to the Utah
State Prison for an indeterminate term not to exceed
one year;
(ii) if the defendant consents to commitment to the
Utah State Prison for an indeterminate term not to
exceed one year, the court may impose the sentence.
The court may not order the imprisonment of a
defendant to the Utah State Prison for a fixed term or
other term that is inconsistent with this section and
Section 77-18-4;
(c) all other misdemeanor commitments shall be to the
jailor other facility designated by the town, city or county
where the defendant was convicted.
(2) Custodial authorities may place a prisoner in a facility
other than the one to which he was committed when:
(a) it does not have space to accommodate him; or
(b) the security of the institution or inmate requires it.
1995

PART 3
FINES AND SPECIAL SANCTIONS
76-3-301. F i n e s of persons.
(1) A person convicted of an offense may be sentenced to pay
3 fine, not exceeding:
(a) $10,000 for a felony conviction of the first degree or
second degree;
(b) $5,000 for a felony conviction of the third degree;
(c) $2,500 for a class A misdemeanor conviction;
(d) $1,000 for a class B misdemeanor conviction;
(e) $750 for a class C misdemeanor conviction or infraction conviction; and
(f) any greater amounts specifically authorized by statute.
(2) This section does not apply to a corporation, association,
Partnership, government, or governmental instrumentality.
1995

76-3-301.5. Uniform fine s c h e d u l e — J u d i c i a l CounciL
(1) The Judicial Council shall establish a uniform recomihended fine schedule for each offense under Subsection 76-3301(1).
(a) The fine for each offense shall proportionally reflect
the seriousness of the offense and other factors as determined in writing by the Judicial Council.
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(b) The schedule shall be reviewed annually by the
Judicial Council.
(c) The fines shall be collected under Section 77-18-1.
(2) The schedule shall incorporate:
(a) criteria for determining aggravating and mitigating
circumstances; and
(b) guidelines for enhancement or reduction of the fine,
based on aggravating or mitigating circumstances.
(3) Presentence investigation reports shall include documentation of aggravating and mitigating circumstances as
determined under the criteria, and a recommended fine under
the schedule.
(4) The Judicial Council shall also establish a separate
uniform recommended fine schedule for the juvenile court and
by rule provide for its implementation.
(5) This section does not prohibit the court from in its
discretion imposing no fine, or a fine in any amount up to and
including the maximum fine, for the offense.
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76-3-302. Fines of corporations, associations, partnerships, or government instrumentalities.
A corporation, association, partnership, or governmental
instrumentality shall pay a fine for an offense defined in this
code for which no special corporate fine is specified. The fine
shall not exceed:
(1) $20,000 for a felony conviction;
(2) $10,000 for a class A misdemeanor conviction;
(3) $5,000 for a class B misdemeanor conviction; and
(4) $1,000 for a class C misdemeanor conviction or for
an infraction conviction.
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76-3-303. Additional sanctions against corporation or
association — Advertising of conviction —
Disqualification of officer.
(1) When a corporation or association is convicted of an
offense, the court may, in addition to or in lieu of imposing
other authorized sanctions, require the corporation or association to give appropriate publicity of the conviction by notice to
the class or classes of persons or section of the public interested in or affected by the conviction, by advertising in
designated areas, or by designated media or otherwise.
(2) When an executive or high managerial officer of a
corporation or association is convicted of an offense committed
in furtherance of the affairs of the corporation or association,
the court may include in the sentence an order disqualifying
him from exercising similar functions in the same or other
corporations or associations for a period of not exceeding five
years if it finds the scope or willfulness of his illegal actions
make it dangerous or inadvisable for such functions to be
entrusted to him.
1973
PART 4
LIMITATIONS AND SPECIAL PROVISIONS ON
SENTENCES
76-3-401. Concurrent or c o n s e c u t i v e s e n t e n c e s —
Limitations.
(1) A court shall determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more than one felony offense, whether to
impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for the offenses.
Sentences for state offenses shall run concurrently unless the
court states in the sentence t h a t they shall run consecutively.
(2) The court shall order t h a t sentences for state offenses
shall run consecutively if the new offense is committed while
the defendant is imprisoned or on parole unless the court finds
tod states on the record that consecutive sentencing would be
^appropriate.
(3) A court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of
he offenses and the history, character, and rehabilitative
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needs of the defendant in determining whether to impose
consecutive sentences.
(4) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses
arising out of a single criminal episode as defined in Section
76-1-401.
(5) If a court imposes consecutive sentences, the aggregate
maximum of all sentences imposed may not exceed 30 years
imprisonment. However, this limitation does not apply if an
offense for which the defendant is sentenced authorizes the
death penalty or a maximum sentence of life imprisonment.
(6) The limitation in Subsection (5) applies if a defendant:
(a) is sentenced at the same time for more than one
offense;
(b) is sentenced at different times for one or more
offenses, all of which were committed prior to imposition
of sentence for any one or more of them; or
(c) has already been sentenced by a court of this state
other than the present sentencing court or by a court ol
another state or federal jurisdiction.
(7) In determining the effect of consecutive sentences and
the manner in which they shall be served, the Board oi
Pardons and Parole shall treat the defendant as though he has
been committed for a single term that shall consist of the
aggregate of the validly imposed prison terms as follows:
(a) if the aggregate maximum term exceeds the 30-yeai
limitation the maximum sentence is considered to be 3C
years; and
(b) when indeterminate sentences run consecutively
the minimum term, if any, constitutes the aggregate of the
validly imposed minimum terms.
(8) When a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed tc
run concurrently with the other or with a sentence presently
being served, the lesser sentence shall merge into the greatei
and the greater shall be the term to be served. If the sentences
are equal and concurrent, they shall merge into one sentence
with the most recent conviction constituting the time to be
served.
(9) This section may not be construed to restrict the numbei
or length of individual consecutive sentences that may be
imposed or to affect the validity of any sentence so imposed
but only to limit the length of sentences actually served undei
the commitments.
(10) This section may not be construed to limit the author
ity of a court to impose consecutive sentences in misdemeanoi
cases.
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76-3-402. Conviction of lower degree of offense.
(1) If the court, having regard to the nature and circum
stances of the offense of which the defendant was found guiltj
and to the history and character of the defendant, concludes il
would be unduly harsh to record the conviction as being foi
that degree of offense established by statute and to sentenc(
the defendant to an alternative normally applicable to thai
offense, the court may unless otherwise specifically providec
by law enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower degree
of offense and impose sentence accordingly.
(2) If a conviction is for a third degree felony the convictior
is considered to be for a class A misdemeanor if:
(a) the judge designates the sentence to be for a class I
misdemeanor and the sentence imposed is within th<
limits provided by law for a class A misdemeanor; or
(b) (i) the imposition of the sentence is stayed and th<
defendant is placed on probation, whether committee
to jail as a condition of probation or not;
(ii) the defendant is subsequently discharged with
out violating his probation; and
(iii) the judge upon motion and notice to the pros
ecuting attorney, and a hearing if requested by eithe
party or the court, finds it is in the interest of justice
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76-8-501
PARTS

FALSIFICATION IN OFFICIAL MATTERS
76-8-501. Definitions.
For the purposes of this part:
(1) "Official proceeding" means any proceeding before a
legislative, judicial, administrative, or other governmental body or official authorized by law to take evidence
under oath or affirmation, including a notary or other
person taking evidence in connection with any of these
proceedings.
(2) "Material" means capable of affecting the course or
outcome of the proceeding. A statement is not material if
it is retracted in the course of the official proceeding in
which it was made before it became manifest that the
falsification was or would be exposed and before it substantially affected the proceeding. Whether a statement is
material is a question of law to be determined by the
court.
1973
76-8-502. False or inconsistent material statements.
A person is guilty of a felony of the second degree if in any
official proceeding:
(1) He makes a false material statement under oath or
affirmation or swears or affirms the truth of a material
statement previously made and he does not believe the
statement to be true; or
(2) He makes inconsistent material statements under
oath or affirmation, both within the period of limitations,
one of which is false and not believed by him to be true. In
a prosecution under this section, it need not be alleged or
proved which of the statements is false but only that one
or the other was false and not believed by the defendant to
be true.
1973

76-8-503. False or inconsistent statements.
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if:
(1) He makes a false statement under oath or affirmation or swears or affirms the truth of the statement
previously made and he does not believe the statement to
be true if:
(a) The falsification occurs in an official proceeding, or is made with a purpose to mislead a public
servant in performing his official functions; or
(b) The statement is one which is required by law
to be sworn or affirmed before a notary or other
person authorized to administer oaths; or
(2) He makes inconsistent statements under oath or
affirmation, both within the period of limitations, one of
which is false and not believed by him to be true. In a
prosecution under this section, it need not be alleged or
proved which of the statements is false but only that one
or the other was false and not believed by the defendant to
be true.
(3) No person shall be guilty under this section if he
retracts the falsification before it becomes manifest that
the fafsificatibn was or woufd be exposed.
1973

76-8-504. Written false statement.
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if:
(1) He makes a written false statement which he does
not believe to be true on or pursuant to a form bearing a
notification authorized by law to the effect that false
statements made therein are punishable; or
(2) With intent to deceive a public servant in the
performance of his official function, he.
(a) Makes any written false statement which he
does not believe to be true; or
(b) Knowingly creates a false impression in a written application for any pecuniary or other benefit by
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omitting information necessary to prevent stated
ments therein from being misleading; or
(c) Submits or invites reliance on any writing
which he knows to be lacking in authenticity; or ;
(d) Submits or invites reliance on any sample*
specimen, map, boundary mark, or other object which
he knows to be false.
^
(3) No person shall be guilty under this section if ^
retracts the falsification before it becomes manifest that
the falsification was or would be exposed.
19^3
76-8-505. Perjury or false swearing — Proof of falsity
of statements — Denial of criminal guilt
(1) On any prosecution for perjury or false swearing, except
a prosecution upon inconsistent statements, pursuant to Subsection 76-8-502(2), falsity of a statement may not be established solely through contradiction by the testimony of a single
witness.
(2) No prosecution shall be brought under this part when
the substance of the defendant's false statement is his denial
of guilt in a previous criminal trial.
1973
76-8-506. Provision of false information to law enforcement officers, government agencies, or
specified professionals.
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he:
(1) knowingly gives or causes to be given false information to any law enforcement officer with a purpose of
inducing the officer to believe that another has committed
an offense; or
(2) knowingly gives or causes to be given to any law
enforcement officer, any state or local government agency
or personnel, or to any person licensed in this state to
practice social work, psychology, or marriage and family
therapy, information concerning the commission of an
offense, knowing that the offense did not occur or knowing
t h a t he has no information relating to the offense or
danger.
1988

76-8-507. False personal information to peace officer.
A person commits a class C misdemeanor if, with intent of
misleading a peace officer as to his identity, birth date, or place
of residence, he knowingly gives a false name, birth date, or
address to a peace officer in the lawful discharge of his official
duties.

1983

76-8-508. Tampering with witness — Retaliation
against witness or informant — Bribery —
Communicating a threat.
(1) A person is guilty of a third degree felony if, believing
that an official proceeding or investigation is pending or about
to be instituted, he attempts to induce or otherwise cause a
person to:
(a) testify or inform falsely;
(b) withhold any testimony, information, document,
item;
(c) elude legal process summoning him to provide evidence,* or
(d) absent himself from any proceeding or investigation
to which he has been summoned.
(2) A person is guilty of a third degree felony if he:
(a) commits any unlawful act in retaliation for anything done by another as a witness or informant;
(b) solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any benefit in
consideration of his doing any of the acts specified under
Subsection (1); or
(c) communicates to a person a threat that a reasonable person would believe to be a threat to do bodily injury
to the person, because of any act performed or to be
performed by the person in his capacity as a witness or
informant in an official proceeding or investigation. 1988

3
(3) The Supreme Court shall by rule govern the practice of
law, including admission to practice law and the conduct and
discipline of persons admitted to the practice of law.
1986
78-2-5.

Repealed.

1988

78-2-6. Appellate court administrator.
The appellate court administrator shall appoint clerks and
support staff as necessary for the operation of the Supreme
Court and the Court ofAppeals. The duties of the clerks and
support staff shall be established by the appellate court
administrator, and powers established by rule of the Supreme
Court.
78-2-7.

1986
Repealed.

1986

78-2-7.5. S e r v i c e of sheriff to court.
The court may at any time require the attendance and
services of any sheriff in the state.
1988
78-2-8 t o 78-2-14.

Repealed.

1986, 1988

CHAPTER 2a
COURT OF APPEALS
Section
78-2a-l.
78-2a-2.
78-2a-3.
78-2a-4.
78-2a-5.

Creation — Seal.
Number of judges
Terms — Functions —
Filing fees.
Court ofAppeals jurisdiction.
Review of actions by Supreme Court.
Location of Court ofAppeals.

78-2a-l. Creation — Seal.
There is created a court known as the Court ofAppeals. The
Court ofAppeals is a court of record and shall have a seal.
1986

78-2a-2. Number of judges — Terms — Functions —
Filing fees.
(1) The Court ofAppeals consists of seven judges. The term
of appointment to office as a judge of the Court ofAppeals is
until the first general election held more than three years
after the effective date of the appointment. Thereafter, the
term of office of a judge of the Court ofAppeals is six years and
commences on the first Monday in January, next following the
date of election. A judge whose term expires may serve, upon
request of the Judicial Council, until a successor is appointed
and qualified. The presiding judge of the Court of Appeals
shall receive as additional compensation $1,000 per annum or
fraction thereof for the period served.
(2) The Court ofAppeals shall sit and render judgment in
panels of three judges. Assignment to panels shall be by
random rotation of all judges of the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals by rule shall provide for the selection of a
chair for each panel. The Court ofAppeals may not sit en banc.
(3) The judges of the Court ofAppeals shall elect a presiding judge from among the members of the court by majority
vote of all judges. The term of office of the presiding judge is
two years and until a successor is elected. A presiding judge of
the Court ofAppeals may serve in that office no more than two
successive terms. The Court ofAppeals may by rule provide for
an acting presiding judge to serve in the absence or incapacity
of the presiding judge.
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the office of
presiding judge by majority vote of all judges of the Court of
Appeals. In addition to the duties of a judge of the Court of
Appeals, the presiding judge shall:
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of panels,
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court;

(c) call and preside over the meetings of the CWj
Appeals; and
,
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme (%
and the Judicial Council.
(5) Filing fees for the Court ofAppeals are the same as J
the Supreme Court.
jj
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction.
;:
(1) The Court ofAppeals has jurisdiction to issue alf A
traordinary writs and to issue all writs and process necesgar
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and d
crees; or
^
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
^
(2) The Court ofAppeals has appellate jurisdiction, incluc
ing jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
F
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from forma
adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals frou
the district court review of informal adjudicative proceed
ings of the agencies, except the Public Service Comnus
sion, State Tax Commission, School and Institutiona
Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Sovereigt
Lands and Forestry actions reviewed by the executive
director of the Department of Natural Resources, Board oi
Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political
subdivisions of the state or other local agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section
63-46a-12.1;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except those from
the small claims department of a circuit court;
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in
criminal cases, except those involving a charge of a first
degree or capital felony;
(f) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases,
except those involving a conviction of a first degree or
capital felony;
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary
writs sought by persons who are incarcerated or serving
any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting
a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first
degree or capital felony;
(h) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of the Board of
Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first
degree or capital felony;
(i) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support, visitation,
adoption, and paternity;
(j) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and
(k) cases transferred to the Court ofAppeals from the
Supreme Court.
(3) The Court ofAppeals upon its own motion only and by
the vote of four judges of the court may certify to the Supreme
Court for original appellate review and determination any
matter over which the Court ofAppeals has original appellate
jurisdiction.
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures
Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings.
1W5
78-2a-4. Review of actions by Supreme Court.
Review of the judgments, orders, and decrees of the Court of
Appeals shall be by petition for writ of certiorari to the
Supreme Court.
*986
78-2a-5. Location of Court ofAppeals.
The Court ofAppeals has its principal location in Salt Lake
City. The Court ofAppeals may perform any of its functions in
l9S
any location withm the state
*

PRIVATE
STATE OF UTAH
ADULT PROBATION AND PAROLE
REGION V, CEDAR CITY
2134 North Main
Cedar City, Utah 84720
Telephone: (801)586-0102

PRESENTENCE INVESTIGATION REPORT
Date Due: 10-05-95
Sentencing Date: 10-10-95

JUDGE ROBERT T BRAITHWAITE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT
CEDAR CITY
(CITY)

IRON UTAH
(COUNTY)

RODNEY SEYMOUR INVESTIGATOR

NAME: ANDERSON, MARK DONELSON
ALIASES: MARK ANDERSON
ADDRESS: IRON COUNTY
CORRECTIONAL FACILITY, CEDAR CITY,
UTAH
BIRTHDATE: 01-06-50 AGE: 45
BIRTHPLACE: SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH
LEGAL RESIDENCE: UTAH
MARITAL STATUS: DIVORCED

COURT CASE NO: 941500984
OBSCIS NO: 99914957
CO-DEFENDANTS: NONE
OFFENSE: DUI/Class A; DRIVING ON
SUSPENSION/Class B; FALSE
INFORMATION TO POLICE/Class B
PLEA: NOT ANNOUNCED, FOUND
GUILTY IN DEFENDANTS ABSENCE
DATE: 04-24-95
PROSECUTING ATTY: SCOTT M BURNS
DEFENSE ATTY: JAMES M PARK
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PLEA BARGAIN: Mark Anderson was originally charged with DUI, a Class A Misdemeanor; Driving
on Suspension, a Class B Misdemeanor; and False Information to Police, a Class B Misdemeanor. On
04-24-95, the Defendant was convicted in all three counts in his absence.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Scott M. Burns, Iron County Attorneys Office.
OFFICIAL VERSION OF OFFENSE: On October 8, 1994, on 1-15 near Cedar city, Utah, Adam
Russell was driving a vehicle (pulling a trailer) and headed toward his home when he was struck
violently from behind by another vehicle. Mr. Russell's vehicle careened off the highway and rolled,
causing extensive and serious injuries to Mr. Russell, including neck injuries that required treatment
with a "halo" and pins in his head. UHP Trooper Doug Twitchell responded to the accident scene and
located another male individual "hiding in the bushes" and obviously intoxicated. The individual, later
identified as Mark D. Anderson, initially gave Trooper Twitchell the name of his brother (who is
deceased), and it took several hours for Trooper Twitchell to learn that the Defendant had provided a
false name. The State of Utah believes that the Defendant submitted a fa1:- name because he has an
extensive criminal record and had numerous wants and warrants for DUI's and other traffic offenses.
Trooper Twitchell also learned that the Defendant has not had a valid Utah driver's license since 1985.
After several trials in absentia, and several efforts to locate the Defendant for trial and sentencing, the
Defendant was ultimately convicted (in his absence) on April 24, 1995, of Driving Under the Influence
of Alcohol, a Class A Misdemeanor (DUI involving injuries); Driving on a Suspended or Revoked
License, a Class B Misdemeanor; and False Information to a Law Enforcement Officer, a Class B
Misdemeanor. The Defendant fled to the State of Oregon, was located, and refused to waive extradition.
The Iron County Attorney's Office forwarded Governor's Warrant extradition documents to Oregon.
After several hearings in Oregon regarding extradition, days before the Governor's Warrant was to
arrive, the Defendant waived extradition and was returned to Utah.
On September 6, 1995, the Defendant appeared before the Court for sentencing. The Court ordered a
presentence investigation report prior to sentencing, which has been set for October 10, 1995, at 9:00
a.m. in Cedar City, Utah.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Iron County Attorney's Office.
DEFENDANT'S VERSION OF OFFENSE: "I was driving south bound on 115 from Salt Lake to
St. George I was in slow lane and seen tail lights of vie in front of me so I put on left hand sig and all of
a sudden a trailer right in front of me being towed with no tail lights and couldn't hardly see it even
being right on top of it. So I turned to the left and hit trailer on left side, my car on right side, of front of
car if there would have been lights on trailer that was being towed there wouldn't have been an accident,
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also it appeard to me the vie. was under min speed but I could be wrong about that. Also I had two
drinks before I left Salt Lake and none on the road there was no alcohol in my car. I had been on road 4
to 5 hours plus stoped and got a hamburger to eat on way before all this happened. Also you have this as
a promise there will be no more DUIs cuz I quit drinking."
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Written statement made by Mark D. Anderson.
CO-DEFENDANT STATUS: None
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Police Reports and investigators comments.
VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENT. The victim's wife in this matter responded with a typed letter. Her
letter is attached for the courts review.
The victim's wife indicated that the Defendant had to be life flighted to LDS Hospital, also that the
family along with the children had suffered extensively due to the lack of the fathers physical abilities.
The recommendation by the victim indicated the following: "We feel Mark Anderson should be
punished to the fullest extent of the law. And even then, it is still not enough. My husband spent
longer out of work, than Mark Anderson ever will in jail. Also, we lost more money and property,
than Mark Anderson will ever own from this accident."
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Victim's wife.
RESTITUTION: According to the victim's wife in this matter, there is pending civil litigation. The
victim's family indicated that much of their losses was covered by the State of Utah insurance and
various sources. (Please see victim letter).
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Investigation by this officer.
CUSTODY STATUS: Mark Anderson was arrested on 06-15-95 in Oregon. If sentencing takes place
on 10-10-95 he will have served 117 days incarcerated. Mr. Anderson was booked into the Iron County
Facility in Cedar City on 08-25-95.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Utah State Iron County Correctional Facility and Defendant.
LAW ENFORCEMENT STATEMENT: Doug Twitchell of the Utah State Highway Patrol, and also
the investigating officer on this matter indicated that Mr. Anderson needs serious help and/or put him
away.
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SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Law enforcement officers comment.
JUVENILE RECORD: According to a presentence report prepared by the State of Utah/Adult
Probation and Parole, on or about 05-05-80, it indicated that the Defendant had the following juvenile
record between 1961 and 1967. Destruction of Property, Destruction of Property, Truancy, Theft,
Trespassing, Depriving Owner of Vehicle, Theft, Curfew, Auto Theft, Fraud, and Public Intoxication
with Possession of Tobacco. According to the presentence report prepared by the State of Utah, it
indicated that Mr. Anderson was committed to the Utah State Industrial School in October of 1965 and
he served approximately one year in that institution. Mr. Anderson may want to expound on his juvenile
record. The Defendant indicated many of these entries did not result in convictions.
SOURCE Ob INFORMATION: Adult Probation and Parole presentence report prepared on or about
05-05-80 and Defendant.
ADULT RECORD: Using the name Mark D. Anderson with the date of birth 01-06-50, it shows that
the Defendant in this matter has an FBI number of 723272G. This also appears to match the SSN listed
by arresting officers on this current matter of 528-74-2928.
DATE

AGENCY

OFFENSE

DISPOSITION

01-17-69

Salt Lake City SO
Utah

Burglary, Grand Larceny

Dismissed per this agencies
information

10-19-69

Salt Lake City SO
Utah

Petty Larceny

Dismissed according to this
agencies information

01-19-70

San Diego PD
California

Burglary/Criminal
Conspiracy reduced To
Petty Larceny

Probation; terminated 10-20-70

06-24-70

Salt Lake City PD
Utah

Grand Larceny, Burglary I

10-13-70 Burglary I dismissed,
Grand Larceny reduced to lesser
included offense of Petty Larceny

12-03-71

Salt Lake City SO
Utah

Receiving Services By
Deception

Dismissed
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DATE

AGENCY

OFFENSE

DISPOSITION

03-04-73

Salt Lake City SO
Utah

Grand Larceny

Dismissed

09-20-73

Salt Lake City SO
Utah

DUI/Carrying Concealed
Weapon

According to AP&P records, he
was placed on Probation

04-11-74

Salt Lake City SO
Utah

Driving On Revocation

6 months Salt Lake County Jail, 12
months probation and halfway
house. According to AP records, this
was terminated on 08-16-75.

01-22-75

Salt Lake City SO
Utah

Failure to Appear,
DUI

No disposition

05-15-76

Constable

Three commitments:
Failure To Appear,
Receiving & Retaining
Utah Safety Inspection
Sticker, Displaying
Unlawful Safety Inspection
Sticker

15 days jail and/or $105
fine

07-25-77

UHP

Driving on Revocation,
Expired Safety Inspection
Sticker

Unknown

11-19-78

Salt Lake City SO
Utah

DUI

Dismissed

04-05-79

UHP

Failure To Appear

Unknown

03-08-80

Ogden PD
Utah

Theft By Deception,
Carrying a Concealed
Weapon

Committed to the Utah
State Prison on 05-13-80
for 0-5 years
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DATE

AGENCY

OFFENSE

DISPOSITION

01-16-82

Lehi PD
Utah

DUI

None listed

05-06-82

Salt Lake City SO
Utah

Possession of Controlled
Substance

Unknown

12-18-82

Salt Lake City SO
Utah

DUI

Unknown

05-18-83

Centerville PD
Utah

Larceny

Unknown

06-14-85

Salt Lake City SO
Utah

DUI.

Unknown

06-20-85

Salt Lake City SO
Utah

Shoplifting, False
Information to Police

Unknown

12-26-85

American Fork PD
Utah

Theft By Receiving

Unknown

02-03-86

Orem PD
Utah

Theft By Receiving

Unknown

02-11-86

American Fork PD
Utah

Theft By Receiving

It appears Mr. Anderson was
committed to Utah State Prison on
10-24-86 for Theft By
Receiving/Two Counts; 0-5
years

06-02-91

Salt Lake SO
Utah

DUI, Driving On
Revocation, Never
Obtaining a License,
Unlicensed Person to
Drive

It appears case #912005318
was reduced to Reckless
Alcohol Related Class B,
guilty
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DATE

AGENCY

OFFENSE

DISPOSITION

02-22-92

Las Vegas PD
Nevada

Possession of Controlled
Substance - Felony

$225 fine, reducfed to Misdemeanor
Mr. Anderson in ordered review
indicated he was in a car with four
others. The car was stopped by
police and someone threw an illicit
drug out of the car. Mr. Anderson
was charged due to it being his car.

04-09-92

Salt Lake City SO
Utah

Unknown
DUI, Driving on
Revocation, Speeding,
License on Wrong
Vehicle, FTA, Never
Obtaining A License,
Open Container,
Intoxication, Allowing
Unlicensed Person to Drive

04-20-92

Manti SO
Utah

DUI, Driving On
Suspension, Open
Container

Mr. Anderson states he paid a
$1,500 fine and matter is cleared
successfully.

06-27-93

Las Vegas PD
Nevada

Burglary, Felony

Unknown

10-08-94

UHP

DUI, Driving on
Suspension, False Info,
to Police Officer

Present Offense Pending

10-18-94

Washington Co. SO
St. George, Utah

DUI

Checks with Washington County
Sheriffs Office and criminal courts
in this jurisdiction showed no
warrants or pending action.
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SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Criminal history check, Adult Probation and Parole records of the
State of Utah and oral/written interview with Mr. Anderson.
DRIVING HISTORY: Mr. Anderson has many driving violations listed including speeding, improper
registration, no license, faulty equipment and others.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Correctional records.
PENDING CASES: There are no pending cases.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Criminal history check.
PROBATION/PAROLE HISTORY: It appears the Defendant was on supervision as a juvenile (please
see juvenile criminal history). According to Utah State Adult Probation and Parole,rthe Defendant was
under probation supervision between 1974 and 1975. According to the correctional records, the
Defendant had major difficulties from repeated traffic offenses. It appears that probation was terminated
on this matter in 1975. In 1980, the Defendant was referred to the Department of Utah Corrections for a
presentence report for Carrying a Concealed Weapon, a Third Degree Felony. It appears that the
Defendant was detained by store security at Grand Central stores in Weber County. It appears that the
Defendant had on his possession a pistol. According to the presentence report, the Defendant handed the
pistol to the arresting officer indicating that he was carrying it for self protection. It is noted that in Mr.
Anderson's shoes during his arrest on this matter there was found a number of small white pills with
crosses on the top. According to the presentence report, it appears that the pills were speed. Mr.
Anderson indicated in oral interview with this investigator he was holding pills for his girlfriend. It
appears that Mr. Anderson was committed to the Utah State Prison. Mr. Anderson was committed to the
Utah State Prison also for Theft By Receiving, a Third Degree Felony/Two Counts. It appears the
Defendant was committed in 1986 on this matter. It appears that the Department of Corrections and
Board of Pardons closed their supervision of Mr. Anderson on or about 04-25-91 with successful
termination.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Criminal history check, Utah State Corrections, Board of Pardons
Information and interview with Defendant.
BACKGROUND AND PRESENT LIVING SITUATION: Mark Donelson Anderson was born
January 6, 1950 in Salt Lake City, Utah to the union of Eugene and Elaine Anderson. There were two
sons and one daughter born to the union. From a prior presentence report, the Defendant described his
childhood as lousy that his mother and father fought like dogs and cats for as long as he could recall.
The Defendant indicated that his father and mother were divorced when he was approximately 12 years
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of age and that his mother consequently remarried Kenneth Hyde when he was approximately 14 years
of age. The Defendant left home at 16 years of age. The Defendant was subsequently committed to the
State Industrial School as a teenager. The Defendant has a sister still living. The Defendant's father's
whereabouts are unknown. The Defendant's mother passed away in 1994. The Defendant plans to
return to Oregon when this matter is resolved.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Defendant and presentence report.
MARITAL HISTORY: The Defendant married LeAnn Williams on May 2, 1969 in San Diego,
California. The Defendant was divorced in February 1979. The Defendant has three children as a result
of that union. In 1982 the Defendant married Debbie Anderson, two children were born to this union.
The Defendant was divorced in 1989. The children, ages 10 and 13, live in Oregon with their mother.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Defendant and correctional records.
EDUCATION: The Defendant completed his eleventh grade at the Utah State Industrial School. The
Defendant, according to a prior presentence report, had completed a General Motors school in the field
of auto mechanics.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Defendant and prior presentence report.
GANG AFFILIATIONS. The Defendant is not a member of any gangs.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Criminal history check and Defendant.
PHYSICAL HEALTH: The Defendant describes his physical health as fair. Mr. Anderson indicated
that since being incarcerated medical staff found a tumor in his back.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Defendant and presentence report.
MENTAL HEALTH: The Defendant describes his mental health as being affected by the death of
loved ones. It is noted Mr. Anderson's mother passed away recently along with other family members.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Defendant and investigator.
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ALCOHOL HISTORY: The Defendant has numerous arrests related to alcohol. It appears to this
investigator that this is a serious, intensive, and extensive problem for Mr. Anderson. Mr. Anderson
indicated alcohol only became a real problem in the past four years.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Correctional records, criminal history check, and Defendant.
DRUG HISTORY: The Defendant has a prior record which includes illicit drugs. Mr. Anderson
indicated in oral interview with this investigator he's used marijuana several times.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Correctional records, criminal history check, and Defendant.
EMPLOYMENT HISTORY: TheDefendant states he is self employed as a mechanic. He can earn
between $1,000 or $2,000 per month when employed. The defendant's Social Security Number is
528-74-2928.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Correctional records and Defendant.
FINANCIAL SITUATION: The Defendant is basically indigent, having few assets.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Defendant.
MILITARY RECORD: The Defendant has never served in any branch of the armed services.
SOURCE OF INFORMATION: Defendant and investigators comments.
COLLATERAL CONTACTS: A letter from the victim reads as follows:
"Mark Anderson was the drunk driver who hit my husband from the behind while he was coming
home from the Elk Hunt on October 8, 1994. (Victim) received a broken neck, broken ribs, and
other cuts. He was taken by ambulance from the scene of the accident to Valley View Medical
Center, where he was later transported by ambulance to the Cedar City Municipal Airport, where
he was then taken by Life Flight, to the Salt Lake City International Airport, where once again,
he was transported by ambulance, to L.D.S. Hospital in Salt Lake City, Utah. Where he then
underwent surgery for 6 hours, to fix his broken neck. He was then in the hospital for 10 days.
He had a halo screwed into his head for 2 lA months, then a collar (hard) for 2 54 month. He was
out of work for a total of 6 months. He still has limited movement in his neck, and also limited
use of his neck and also limited use of his right arm and hand. (Victim) will not be able to
advance any further in his trade, due to his injuries. Our total lossess and medical bills have
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exceeded well over the range of $ 150,000.00!!!! Our whole family has suffered a lot because of
this accident. Our children were unable to have a normal relationship, that children do with their
dads, because of his injuries. I had to take care of our 4 children, as well as for (victim) for 4
months before, he could do normal things on his own. We feel Mark Anderson should be
punished to the fullest extent of the law. And even then, it is still not enough. (Victim) spent
longer out of work, then Mark Anderson ever will in jail. Also, we lost more money and
property, then Mark Anderson will ever ownfromthis accident. We lost these items: a Jeep
Wagonneer, 4 wheeler, 16 foot trailer. All of these items were paid for priorto this accident.
Because of this accident, and Mark Anderson being uninsured, we had to take a total loss for
someone like this person who is out there driving on the streets and highways without any
insurance what so ever. And, Mark Anderson still continues to drive uninsured and unlicensed
whenever he wants, and he is going to end up killing someone some day if some action is not
taken to this matter. We sincerely hope that you will take the time to really think about what
kind of person this Mark Anderson really is, and what he could do to other people if no kind of
action or extent of the law is used against him. Thank you for your time in this matter."
A letter from Scott M. Burns, Iron County Attorney, reads as follows:
"The Defendant has shown, as evidenced by his criminal record, a complete and total disregard
for the law and for the safety of others. He has driven without a driver's license since 1985, has
been charged with multiple DUI and other traffic offenses, and attempts to continue driving by
his professed sophistication in not being caught or convicted. The Defendant was extradited
from Oregon where he fled under the assumption that he could not be extradited back to Utah.
He was wrong. I sincerely believe that this Defendant is a danger to the good citizens of Utah, he
will continue to drink and drive, and that he should serve the full eighteen (18) months
incarceration in the Iron County Jail. I believe that is the only way the justice system will
impress upon the severity of his actions. I strongly suggest that you contact the victim in this
case for their recommendations as well."
EVALUATIVE SUMMARY: Brought before the court for sentencing is Mark Donelson Anderson, a
45 year old male who has an extensive alcohol related criminal history. The Defendant has numerous
prior arrests for DUI's according to the criminal history printout. It also appears according to this
investigators information that the Defendant was not cooperative with law enforcement on this matter. It
is noted that Mr. Anderson has been committed to the Utah State Prison on a prior occasion, and appears
to know the law enforcement system well. The victim on this matter indicated that the Defendant should
be punished to the fullest extent of the law, and this investigator concurs from the point of community
safety. It is hoped that Mr. Anderson would use the tools that he has learned in the past and seek new
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learning methods in avoiding the use of alcohol that has damaged his life and others as evidenced from
this current criminal episode.
Aggravating circumstances in this case in part appear to be:
1.

Extensive alcohol use history going back to 1970fs.

2.

The Defendant's lack of cooperation in this case including false information to police and
extradition.

3.

Prior prison commitments.

4.

Prior probation and parole privilege.

5.

Extensive damage to property (vehicle).

6.

Extensive medical costs and disability to victim.

7.

Extensive criminal history includes burglary, weapons possession, and theft.

8.

Victim request for punishment.

9.

Prior juvenile record.

10.

Intensive criminal history, over 20 adult entries.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

RODNEY SEYMOUR, INVESTIGATOR

AGENCY RECOMMENDATION

D ™ " n o t be placed on probation bu, serve 18 months m the Iron County Jarl.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,

RODNEY SEYMOUR, INVESTIGATOR
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AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
(Use Form 2 For Mandatory Sentence Situations)
Circle the numbers of circumstances that may justify departure from the
guidelines. Reference the page number of the presentence investigation where
the judge can find supportive information.
Aggravating Circumstances
Only use aggravating circumstances if they are not implicit in the conviction
offense or the calculation of criminal history score.
PSI Page #
i-r
1.
2.
3.
\s
4.
5.
}s
6.

s
r

Established instances of repetitive criminal conduct.
Offender presents a serious threat of violent behavior.
Victim was particularly vulnerable.
Injury to person or property loss was unusually extensive.
Offense was characterized by extreme cruelty or depravity.
There were multiple charges or victims.
Offender's attitude is not conducive to supervision in a less
restrictive setting.
8.
Offender continued criminal activity subsequent to arrest.
9.
Sex Offenses: Correction's formal assessment procedures classify
as an high risk offender.
.
10. Other (specify) fV&spyv&A*fyVs>
/yitfh
fl^Sfa,
Mitigating Circumstances
1.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Offender's criminal conduct neither caused nor threatened
serious harm.
Offender acted under strong provocation.
There were substantial grounds to excuse or justify criminal
behavior, though failing to establish a defense.
Offender is young.
Offender assisted law enforcement in the resolution of other
crimes.
Restitution would be severely compromised by incarceration.
Offender's attitude suggests amenability to supervision.
Domestic crime victim does not want incarceration.
Offender has exceptionally good employment and/or family
relationships.
Imprisonment would entail excessive hardship on offender or
dependents.
Offender has extended period of arrest-free street time.
Other (specify)
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